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RESTORING THE FACT/LAW DISTINCTION IN 
PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
J. Jonas Anderson* and Peter S. Menell** 
INTRODUCTION 
Two decades ago, the Supreme Court sought to promote more 
effective, transparent patent litigation in Markman v. Westview Instruments1 
by ruling that “the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its 
claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”2 In so doing, the 
Court removed interpretation of patent claims from the black box of jury 
deliberations by holding that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial 
did not extend to patent claim construction. Failing to find clear historical 
evidence of how claim construction was handled in 1791,3 the Court turned 
to “the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries and the statutory 
policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation.”4 It concluded that 
federal district court judges were better equipped than juries to resolve the 
mixed fact/law controversies inherent in construing disputed patent claim 
terms,5 thereby leading to more effective and transparent patent litigation. 
Fully achieving the Court’s goal of more effective and transparent patent 
litigation, however, depends on district judges having the flexibility to learn 
pertinent facts, build a reviewable record, and explain the basis for their 
claim constructions. 
Courts interpret patent claims from the perspective of persons having 
ordinary skill in the art as of the time of the invention.6 Since few judges 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. 
** Koret Professor of Law and Director, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, University of 
California at Berkeley School of Law.      
Professor Anderson and Professor Menell, along with Professor Arti Rai, co-authored an amicus 
brief in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2014) [http://perma.cc/AU5N-
FZ62]. That brief drew upon J. Jonas Anderson and Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, 
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2014) 
[http://perma.cc/MFA5-HXAX]. 
1  517 U.S. 370 (1996) [https://perma.cc/2BDS-SPRY]. 
2  Id. at 372. 
3  Id. at 376–84 (citing Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 
57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 640–643 (1973) [http://perma.cc/4BYA-324K]; Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 
412, 417 (1987) [https://perma.cc/87KF-HJMV]) (explaining that under the “historical test,” the Court 
examines whether a cause of action was tried at law (or was analogous to a cause of action tried at law) 
at the time of the founding of the nation). 
4  Id. at 384. 
5  Id. at 388–90. 
6  See Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
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have such training and knowledge, they must step into the shoes of skilled 
artisans. As Professor William Callyhan Robinson explained more than a 
century ago, the court may look to: 
[T]estimony to explain the meaning of its language, or to expert evidence to 
ascertain the essential characteristics of the described invention and the 
differences between it and other patented inventions, or to papers in the Patent 
Office which are connected with the patent . . . to show the significance which 
[the inventor] attached to the terms.7 
Thus, when parties dispute the skilled artisan’s interpretation of patent 
claim meaning, resolution of the controversy appears to have a factual 
character. 
 
Unfortunately, Markman’s promise of more effective and transparent 
patent adjudication has been frustrated by the Federal Circuit’s adherence to 
de novo review of all aspects of district judges’ claim determinations, 
including how skilled artisans understand patent claim terms.8 This standard 
has had the perverse effect of dissuading district judges from holding 
evidentiary hearings9 or explaining the reasoning behind their claim 
constructions.10 The Federal Circuit’s view that claim construction is a pure 
question of law has instead focused district judges’ attention on reading and 
 
[https://perma.cc/RAZ8-WRJT]. 
7  3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 248 (1890). 
8  See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (en banc), vac’d and remanded sub nom. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Universal Lighting 
Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015) (mem.) [https://perma.cc/K84J-FNVP]; Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) [https://perma.cc/X2QH-T4DD]. 
9  Commenting on the high reversal rate for claim construction, one district court judge has observed 
that “you might as well throw darts.” See Anandashankar Mazumdar, Federal District Courts Need 
Experts that Are Good ‘Teachers,’ Judges Tell Bar, 70 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 536, 
537 (Sept. 16, 2005) (quoting Judge Marsha J. Pechman of the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Washington). See generally J. Jonas Anderson and Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A 
Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 
(2014) [hereinafter Informal Deference] [http://perma.cc/MFA5-HXAX]. 
10  See, e.g., Hollingsworth & Vose Filtration Ltd. v. Delstar Techs., Inc., No. 10-788 GMS (D. Del. 
Jul. 10, 2012), available at http:// www.scribd.com/doc/100456939/Hollingsworth-Vose-Filtration-Ltd-
v-Delstar-Techs-Inc-C-A-No-10-788-GMS-D-Del-Jul-10-2012 (Order Construing the Terms of U.S. 
Pat. No. 6,623,548) (cursory opinion with no discussion of factual predicates, evidentiary sources, or 
explication of the claim construction process; footnotes limited to discussion of intrinsic sources and 
Federal Circuit jurisprudence) [http://perma.cc/9EAA-EJZQ]; Shelbyzyme LLC v. Genzyme Corp., No. 
09-768 GMS (D. Del. Jul. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.delawareiplaw.com/2011/07/chief_judge_sleet_claim_constr.html (Order Construing the 
Terms of U.S. Pat. No. 7,011,831) (cursory opinion with a footnote summarizing Federal Circuit 
precedent emphasizing the primacy of intrinsic evidence and noting that “the parties presented 
conflicting extrinsic evidence . . . which the court will not consider”) [http://perma.cc/HQ97-9QEB]; In 
re Rembrandt Techs., LP Patent Litig., No. 07-md-1848 GMS, 2008 WL 5773604 (D. Del. Nov. 19, 
2008) (construing over 100 claim terms without setting forth any analysis in the claim construction 
order). 
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rereading the patent specification without the opportunity to fully and 
directly engage with those most familiar and conversant with patent claim 
language in its technological, industrial, and claim-drafting context. For 
district judges to even intimate that they were making factual findings 
invited reversal.11 
The Supreme Court returned to the issue of patent claim construction 
during its current Term. Overturning two decades of Federal Circuit 
practice, the Court’s much anticipated decision in Teva Pharmaceuticals 
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.12 clearly established that patent claim construction 
can entail fact-finding and restored the fundamental juridical principle—
reflected in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6)—that the Federal 
Circuit, like other appellate courts, must “give due regard to the trial court’s 
opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility” and defer to the trial court’s 
factual determinations unless “clearly erroneous.”13 
Part I of this Article traces the background of the de novo review 
controversy. Part II summarizes the Supreme Court’s Teva decision, 
analyzes the Court’s logic, and then explores the case’s ramifications for 
patent case management in Part III. Finally, Part IV examines the interplay 
between patent claim construction and claim indefiniteness, a related patent 
doctrine that has recently attracted Supreme Court attention.14 
I. THE ROOTS OF THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING DE NOVO 
REVIEW OF PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
The controversy in the Teva decision can be traced back to the rise of 
patent jury trials in the 1970s and 1980s. For much of patent law’s history, 
patent litigators have preferred bench trials. Various factors—such as 
speedier decisions, jurors’ willingness to accord greater significance to a 
patent’s presumption of validity, dispensing with post-trial briefs and 
proposed findings, the greater emphasis on excluding inadmissible 
evidence, and possibly appellate courts’ reluctance to disturb jury 
decisions15—led to a steep rise in the use of juries in patent cases. Juries 
were used in less than 10% of patent cases prior to 1970, but by the early 
1990s, that number rose to over 70%.16 The newly formed Federal Circuit, 
established in 1982, saw this as an impediment to reviewing patent 
 
11  See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1475 (Rader, J., dissenting in part, concurring in the judgment, and 
joining Part IV of the en banc opinion) (suggesting that the de novo standard encourages trial judges to 
“disguise the real reasons for their interpretation”). 
12  135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) [http://perma.cc/AU5N-FZ62]. 
13  FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6); see also Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 834. 
14  See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) [https://perma.cc/U8JQ-
4KP4]. 
15  Gary M. Ropski, Constitutional and Procedural Aspects of the Use of Juries in Patent Litigation 
(Part I), 58 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 609, 612–13 (1976). 
16  Informal Deference, supra note 9, at 18–21. 
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decisions consistently.17 The critical issue of claim construction was 
shrouded in the mystery of jury deliberations. 
A. The Markman Decision: Trial Judges and Claim Construction 
The Federal Circuit considered this impediment to transparency in its 
en banc Markman decision.18 Some Federal Circuit judges assumed that if 
claim construction involved factual issues, then the Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial prevented a district judge from construing the patent 
claim.19 The majority opinion, however, worked around the Seventh 
Amendment impediment by holding that the construction of a patent claim 
is a pure question of law,20 which had the effect of allocating responsibility 
to construe patents to the district judge. It also meant that the district 
judge’s construction of the claim was subject to de novo review.21 The court 
masked the inherently factual nature of claim construction by reasoning that 
although the trial judge may use both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence in 
construing claims: 
[E]n route to pronouncing the meaning of claim language as a matter of law 
based on the patent documents themselves, the court is not crediting certain 
evidence over other evidence or making factual evidentiary findings. Rather, 
the court is looking to the extrinsic evidence to assist in its construction of the 
written document, a task it is required to perform.22 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the 
Seventh Amendment did not require claim construction to be allocated to 
juries, but through very different reasoning.23 The Court held that the 
district judge should be responsible for claim construction based on judges’ 
“training in exegesis [of written instruments],”24 notwithstanding what it 
characterized as the “mongrel [or mixed fact/law] practice” of patent claim 
construction.25 In a critical passage, the Court explained: 
[C]redibility judgments have to be made about the experts who testify in patent 
cases, and in theory there could be a case in which a simple credibility 
judgment would suffice to choose between experts whose testimony was 
 
17  See Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit 
Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1238–39 (1994) [http://perma.cc/LU45-
HBA5]. 
18  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
[https://perma.cc/8CEU-GEZ7]. 
19  See id. at 992–98 (Mayer, J., concurring); 1010–17 (Newman, J., dissenting). But see id. at 983–
87 (majority opinion). 
20  Id. at 978–79. 
21  Id. at 979. 
22  Id. at 981 (italics in original) (footnote omitted). 
23  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
24  Id. at 388. 
25  Id. at 378. 
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equally consistent with a patent’s internal logic. But our own experience with 
document construction leaves us doubtful that trial courts will run into many 
cases like that. In the main, we expect, any credibility determinations will be 
subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document, 
required by the standard construction rule that a term can be defined only in a 
way that comports with the instrument as a whole. Thus, in these cases a jury’s 
capabilities to evaluate demeanor, to sense the “mainsprings of human 
conduct,” or to reflect community standards, are much less significant than a 
trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall structure of 
the patent. The decisionmaker vested with the task of construing the patent is 
in the better position to ascertain whether an expert’s proposed definition fully 
comports with the specification and claims and so will preserve the patent’s 
internal coherence. We accordingly think there is sufficient reason to treat 
construction of terms of art like many other responsibilities that we cede to a 
judge in the normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary 
underpinnings.26 
In contrast to the Federal Circuit’s Markman opinion, the Supreme 
Court did not deem patent claim construction purely a question of law. 
Rather, consistent with its characterization of claim construction as a 
“mongrel practice,” the Court noted merely that claim construction was a 
matter “exclusively within the province of the court.”27 
Barely two weeks after the Supreme Court’s Markman ruling, a 
Federal Circuit panel in another case heavily discounted the use of extrinsic 
evidence, warning that “[a]llowing the public record to be altered or 
changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert testimony, 
would make this right meaningless.”28 By contrast, other Federal Circuit 
opinions viewed claim construction as a mixed question of law and fact for 
which fact-finding could be set aside only upon a showing of clear error.29 
 
B. The Cybor and Phillips Decisions: Adhering to De Novo Review 
This split precipitated the Federal Circuit’s en banc review of the 
appellate claim construction standard in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, 
Inc.30 In a sharply divided decision, a majority of the Federal Circuit 
reaffirmed its view that claim construction is a pure question of law subject 
to de novo review and downplayed the Supreme Court’s more limited 
characterization of claim construction as simply an “issue for the judge, not 
 
26  Id. at 389–90 (citations omitted). 
27  Id. at 372. 
28  Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
[http://perma.cc/FQQ2-K65H]. 
29  See, e.g., Wiener v. NEC Elecs., Inc., 102 F.3d 534, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
[https://perma.cc/R7VB-852H]; Metaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
[https://perma.cc/7MHZ-67NA]. 
30  138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
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the jury.”31 In the majority’s view, “[n]othing in the Supreme Court’s 
opinion supports the view that the Court endorsed a silent, third option—
that claim construction may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of 
fact.”32 The majority discounted the Supreme Court’s characterization of 
claim construction as a “‘mongrel practice . . . fall[ing] somewhere between 
a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact’” as merely “prefatory 
comments.”33 It also overlooked the Supreme Court’s statement that “there 
is sufficient reason to treat construction of terms of art like many other 
responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the normal course of trial, 
notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings.”34 Yet “[c]ourts commonly 
recite the deferential ‘abuse of discretion’ test as broadly and generally 
appropriate on review of evidence calls.”35 
While properly emphasizing the primacy of intrinsic evidence to claim 
construction, the Vitronics and Cybor line of cases steered district judges 
away from learning from skilled artisans and using evidentiary techniques 
for resolving disputes among proffered experts. Following the Cybor 
decision, the unusually high reversal rate for claim construction rulings36 
reached 44.2% on a per claim term basis in 2004,37 signaling dissensus.38 
In an effort to address the inconsistency across its own decisions and 
quell the widespread dissatisfaction among district judges and practitioners 
with its claim construction jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit granted en 
banc review of a wide range of claim construction questions in Phillips v. 
AWH Corp.39 Although the en banc order inviting briefs listed the standard 
 
31  Compare id. at 1455, 1456 (concluding that “the standard of review in [the Federal Circuit’s 
Markman decision] . . . was not changed by the Supreme Court’s decision . . . , and we therefore 
reaffirm that, as a purely legal question, we review claim construction de novo on appeal including any 
allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction”) with Markman, 517 U.S. at 391. 
32  Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455. It is difficult to see how the Supreme Court’s characterization of claim 
construction as a “mongrel practice” did not support the third option. 
33  Id. (quoting Markman, 517 U.S. at 378, 388). 
34  Markman, 517 U.S. at 390. 
35  Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 229 F.R.D. 267, 289 
(2005). 
36  See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 232–34 (2005) [http://perma.cc/9AKZ-RSF7]. 
37  Informal Deference, supra note 9, at 40–41. 
38  The panel decision in Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) [https://perma.cc/6ADH-C6V3] sought to further clarify the claim construction framework by 
recognizing dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises as “particularly useful resources to assist the court 
in determining the ordinary and customary meanings of claim terms” due to their public availability and 
objectivity. Id. at 1202. The court noted that, unlike expert testimony, these reference sources are not 
“colored by the motives of the parties” or “inspired by litigation.” Id. at 1203. “Indeed, these materials 
may be the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better understanding both the 
technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art to describe the technology.” Id. Yet the 
reversal rate continued to rise after the Texas Digital decision. See Informal Deference, supra note 9, at 
41. 
39  376 F.3d 1382 (per curiam) [https://perma.cc/FNB8-8PM4]. 
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of appellate review among the seven questions presented,40 the majority 
opinion ultimately sidestepped the issue. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit 
appeared to backtrack from Vitronics skepticism of the use of extrinsic 
evidence. The majority in Phillips authorized district judges to consider 
extrinsic evidence, but deemed such evidence to be less significant and 
reliable in determining the scope of claim terms.41 The majority recognized 
that expert testimony can be useful: 
[T]o provide background on the technology at issue, to explain how an 
invention works, to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical 
aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to 
establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular 
meaning in the pertinent field. However, conclusory, unsupported assertions 
by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court.42 
While the ultimate Phillips decision formally retained the de novo 
standard, the reversal rate dropped precipitously the week that the Phillips 
argument was heard and has remained approximately one-third below the 
pre-Phillips reversal rate.43 Even though a majority of Federal Circuit 
judges were unwilling to reverse the Cybor de novo standard, our analysis 
reveals that by mid-2005 a consensus emerged among members of the court 
that the court should ratchet back appellate scrutiny of claim construction 
determinations.44 The indications supporting this inference include: (1) the 
reversal rate dropped well before any district court cases that could have 
been influenced by the Phillips decision reached the Federal Circuit,45 (2) 
the rate dropped for all members of the Federal Circuit,46 (3) the rate fell 
across all technology fields except one (business methods—which could be 
explained by the hand-wringing over patent eligibility that ultimately led to 
the Bilski47 and Alice48 decisions),49 and (4) the rate of summary affirmances 
substantially increased following Phillips.50 
 
40  Id. at 1383. 
41  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
[https://perma.cc/6A6L-EH87]. 
42  Id. at 1318 (citations omitted). 
43  Informal Deference, supra note 9, at 61 fig. 10. 
44  See id. at 56–62. 
45  See id. at 61. 
46  See id. at 49–51. 
47  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) [https://perma.cc/2ZQU-UKNQ], aff’d on 
other grounds sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) [https://perma.cc/LW6Z-VE7A]. 
48  CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) [https://perma.cc/6DUP-
JHNM], aff’d on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) [https://perma.cc/QC8B-587A]. 
49  See Informal Deference, supra note 9, at 51–54. 
50  See id. at 54–55. 
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C. The Road to Teva 
The division among Federal Circuit judges over the standard of 
appellate review continued to resurface over the past decade.51 Patent claim 
construction arises in many patent appeals, which forced members of the 
court to confront their differing approaches. In addition, the 2010 
appointment of Judge Kathleen O’Malley brought a trial judge’s 
perspective to the Federal Circuit for the first time in the appellate 
tribunal’s history.52 
In 2013, the Federal Circuit granted en banc review of the standard of 
appellate review of claim construction rulings in Lighting Ballast Control 
LLC v. Philips Electronics North America Corp.53 Many thought the court 
would finally rectify the split over appellate review of claim construction. 
In a surprising opinion—in which several Federal Circuit judges who had 
previously questioned the Cybor de novo standard now voted to perpetuate 
its application—a majority of the court upheld the standard on stare decisis 
grounds.54 In a vigorous dissent, Judge O’Malley, joined by Chief Judge 
Rader and Judges Reyna and Wallach, castigated the majority for 
“misapprehend[ing] the Supreme Court’s guidance, contraven[ing] the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and add[ing] considerable uncertainty and 
expense to patent litigation.”55 While the petition for certiorari in Lighting 
Ballast was pending, the Supreme Court granted review of the standard of 
appellate review of claim construction rulings in Teva Pharmaceuticals 
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. 
II. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. V. SANDOZ: RESTORING THE 
PROPER APPELLATE ROLE 
Teva Pharmaceuticals, the owner of a patent covering the 
manufacturing method for Copaxone, a multiple sclerosis drug, filed suit 
 
51  See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) [https://perma.cc/BE5V-QWQD], 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 833 (2013) (mem.) [https://perma.cc/TMK6-K7E4]; Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. 
eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010) [https://perma.cc/L4HN-UKU3]; id. at 1363–64 
(Clark, District Judge (E.D. Tex.), concurring); Medegen MMS, Inc. v. ICU Med., Inc., 317 F. App’x 
982, 988–91 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Walker, Chief District Judge (N.D. Cal.), dissenting) (urging greater 
deference) [http://perma.cc/79MW-BBZ2]; Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 
1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc) [https://perma.cc/7EGV-7XXE]. 
52  See David Ingram and Mike Scarcella, White House Rolls Out Two More Circuit Nominees, THE 
BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 10, 2010), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/03/white-
house-rolls-out-two-more-circuit-nominees.html [http://perma.cc/2QFV-GKAU]. 
53  500 F. App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
54  Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (en banc), vac’d and remanded sub nom. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Universal Lighting 
Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015) (mem.). 
55  Id. at 1297 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
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against Sandoz and several other firms seeking to market generic versions 
of the drug. Sandoz defended on the grounds that the patent was invalid 
because Copaxone’s active ingredient, characterized as having “a molecular 
weight of 5 to 9 kilodaltons,” was indefinite.56 The patent did not specify 
how molecular weight was determined and hence was “not amenable to 
construction or . . . insolubly ambiguous,”57 the Federal Circuit’s 
indefiniteness standard at the time.58 
Sandoz contended that there were three methods to determine this 
weight—the weight of the most prevalent molecule, the weight as 
calculated by the average weight of all molecules, or weight as calculated 
by an average in which heavier molecules count for more—and therefore 
Teva’s failure to specify a precise meaning rendered the claim insolubly 
ambiguous.59 After considering conflicting expert evidence, the district 
judge credited the testimony of Teva’s expert in concluding that “a skilled 
artisan would understand that the term ‘molecular weight’” is the weight of 
the most prevalent molecule.60 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the 
district judge’s claim construction de novo and concluded that the claim 
term in question was insolubly ambiguous.61 
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari on the issue of the standard 
of appellate review in patent claim construction.62 Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion began with reference to the Court’s 1996 Markman decision, noting 
that the Teva case “involve[d] claim construction with ‘evidentiary 
underpinnings,’”63 an issue that the Federal Circuit downplayed in its 
adherence to the Circuit’s own framework. Justice Breyer then crisply set 
forth the operative principle governing appellate review, holding that 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) requires a court of appeals to 
uphold a district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.64 
The opinion then emphasized that this “clear command” applies to all of the 
courts of appeals and “does not make exceptions or purport to exclude 
 
56  Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 842 (2015). 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) 
requires that “[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention” 
(emphasis added) [http://perma.cc/4A63-6MCH]. 
57  See Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Datamize LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
[https://perma.cc/94YK-MFK2]) [https://perma.cc/7LLG-2QZC]. 
58  The Supreme Court broadened the indefiniteness standard after the lower court determinations in 
Teva. See generally Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014). 
59  Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 836. 
60  Id. 
61  See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
[https://perma.cc/YP76-VCYT]. 
62  Teva, 135 S.Ct. at 836. 
63  Id. at 835. 
64  Id. 
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certain categories of factual findings[, including] both subsidiary and 
ultimate facts [and to findings made by a] district court sitting without a 
jury.”65 
The Court noted that its Markman decision “neither created, nor argued 
for, an exception to Rule 52(a),”66 and recognized that “subsidiary 
factfinding is sometimes necessary” in patent claim construction,67 directly 
contradicting nearly two decades of Federal Circuit jurisprudence. The 
majority recognized that while “[c]onstruction of written instruments often 
presents a ‘question solely of law,’ at least when the words in those 
instruments are ‘used in their ordinary meaning,’” extrinsic evidence may 
help when “a written instrument uses ‘technical words or phrases not 
commonly understood.’”68 “And in that circumstance, the ‘determination of 
the matter of fact’ will ‘preced[e]’ the ‘function of construction.’ . . . This 
factual determination, like all other factual determinations, must be 
reviewed for clear error.”69 
The Supreme Court noted that clear error review is “‘particularly’ 
important” in patent cases because “so much depends upon familiarity with 
specific scientific problems and principles not usually contained in the 
general storehouse of knowledge and experience.”70 The Court further 
emphasized that “[a] district court judge who has presided over, and 
listened to, the entirety of a proceeding has a comparatively greater 
opportunity to gain that familiarity than an appeals court judge who must 
read a written transcript or perhaps just those portions to which the parties 
have referred.”71 
Building on its Markman framework, the Supreme Court’s Teva 
decision endorses a hybrid standard of appellate review that is balanced, 
structurally sound, and legally appropriate. Under this hybrid standard, 
 
65  Id. at 836–37 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985) 
[https://perma.cc/N2MQ-TGUJ]; Pullman–Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982) 
[https://perma.cc/8PPA-YJLP]) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
66  Id. at 837. 
67  Id. at 838. The Court noted that its Markman decision “referred to claim construction as a 
practice with ‘evidentiary underpinnings,’ a practice that ‘falls somewhere between a pristine legal 
standard and a simple historical fact’” and “sometimes” required courts to make “‘credibility judgments’ 
about witnesses.” Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378, 388, 389–90 
(1996)). 
68  Id. at 837. 
69  Id. (quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291–92 (1922) 
[http://perma.cc/GT7M-EMEV]) (alternation in original) (internal citations omitted). 
70  Id. at 838 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950) 
[http://perma.cc/99RA-GWAN]) (internal quotations omitted). 
71  Id. Justice Breyer referenced Judge O’Malley’s dissent in Lighting Ballast contending that 
“Federal Circuit judges ‘lack the tools that district courts have available to resolve factual disputes fairly 
and accurately,’ such as questioning the experts, examining the invention in operation, or appointing a 
court-appointed expert.” Id. at 838–39 (quoting Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. 
Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting)). 
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factual determinations underlying claim construction rulings are subject to 
the “clearly erroneous” (or “abuse of discretion”) standard of review, while 
the Federal Circuit exercises de novo review over the ultimate claim 
construction decision. In this manner, district judges can use their 
distinctive vantage point and evidentiary tools to ferret out factual 
underpinnings while the Federal Circuit can operate as a check on fidelity 
to the patent instrument. Therefore, even though the Federal Circuit retains 
de novo review of whether a trial court’s construction of a patent claim 
comports with the intrinsic evidence—the patent document and prosecution 
history—the appellate court must nonetheless sustain the trial court’s 
subsidiary factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Thus, where the 
intrinsic evidence does not resolve the meaning of a disputed patent claim 
term, the district court’s resolution, if adequately grounded in extrinsic 
evidence, will control.72 
III. IMPLEMENTING THE TEVA REGIME: PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT 
In order to realize the promise of effectiveness and transparency that 
the Supreme Court sought in its Markman decision and garner the deference 
contemplated by Rule 52(a) as stressed in Teva, district judges should (1) 
delineate the disputed subsidiary factual questions prior to the Markman 
proceeding, (2) conduct focused briefing with supporting expert 
declarations and evidentiary hearings to create an adequate record for 
resolving such disputes, and (3) prepare a careful Markman order 
explaining the basis for their claim construction. 
This process can be standardized through augmentation of the Patent 
Local Rules used in many jurisdictions.73 Such rules provide for the 
exchange of proposed terms for construction by specified dates. Thereafter, 
the parties must meet and confer to narrow or resolve differences. If they 
cannot resolve their differences, they must prepare a joint claim 
construction and prehearing statement.74 Within three weeks of the joint 
statement, the parties must simultaneously exchange proposed constructions 
of each disputed claim term and references from the patent specification or 
prosecution history that support its proposed construction and designate any 
supporting extrinsic evidence.75 
The Teva decision can be implemented most effectively by requiring 
parties to specifically identify underlying disputed facts in connection with 
 
72  Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissented on the ground that claim construction does not 
involve fact-finding. Id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent analogized claim construction to 
statutory construction. Id. 
73  See generally PETER S. MENELL, ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE ch. 5 
(Federal Judicial Center, 2d ed. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2114398 [http://perma.cc/P7VX-4FWC]. 
74  See, e.g., N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 4-1 [http://perma.cc/JU34-CGED]. 
75  See id. at 4-2. 
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disputed claim terms and how those disputed facts relate to the intrinsic 
evidence in the joint claim construction statement. The parties should also 
designate their proposed means of resolving the factual disputes. The 
district judge would then be in a position to structure the Markman hearing 
so as to develop a proper record for making factual findings. For example, 
the judge could request that the parties present expert testimony, with cross-
examination. Following the hearing, the judge would then prepare an order 
explaining her view of the intrinsic evidence and any subsidiary factual 
findings. The Federal Circuit would then have a clear record of the basis for 
the judge’s claim construction as well as the judge’s reasoning. 
There is some risk that the Teva decision will result in greater cost and 
delay as parties engage in escalating battles of the experts. Such problems, 
however, are not unique to patent adjudication, although the technological 
complexity of patent cases creates greater opportunity for such tactics. 
District judges must be vigilant in emphasizing the centrality of the intrinsic 
evidence and exercise due caution in entertaining extrinsic evidence. After 
all, the Federal Circuit will scrutinize the district judge’s decision to go 
beyond the intrinsic evidence to interpret claim meaning. 
It is important to recognize that although many terms in patent claims 
are beyond a district judge’s general experience, scientists and engineers 
have relatively clear understandings within their fields. In fact, many of the 
disputed terms that are appealed to the Federal Circuit are not technical 
scientific terms but common terms that are disputed within the context of 
the particular patent claim.76 Scientists or engineers who take unjustified 
positions risk having federal judges impugn their credibility. Since their 
testimony would not occur before a jury, district judges have substantial 
leeway to press the experts to clarify their positions. Over time, this 
possibility should have the desired effect of bringing parties closer together 
in their allegations. 
The Teva decision places a greater onus on district judges to 
understand and explain how they parse claim language. The decision 
affords them greater flexibility to use familiar tools for resolving factual 
disputes—presentation of evidence and expert testimony. At the same time, 
it demands that they delineate how disputed subsidiary facts relate to the 
intrinsic evidence. Ultimately, this framework adds to the reliability of the 
dispute resolution process by bringing better evidence, more careful 
scrutiny, and fuller explication to bear on claim construction. 
By carefully preparing for Markman hearings, selectively using 
focused expert testimony to resolve disputed subsidiary facts, and clearly 
explaining their reasoning, district judges have the ability to achieve the 
goal of effective, transparent, and well-reasoned patent claim constructions. 
As this process takes root, patent litigation will become more predictable 
and understandable. We can also hope that more cases will settle sooner, 
 
76  See Informal Deference, supra note 9, at 68. 
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especially after Markman rulings. 
IV. THE INTERPLAY OF PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND CLAIM 
INDEFINITENESS POST-TEVA 
The Teva decision also implicates appellate review and case 
management of claim indefiniteness, another salient patent law doctrine.77 
As noted above, the claim construction controversy in the Teva case 
pertained to Sandoz’s assertion of a claim indefiniteness invalidity defense. 
Since the district judge upheld the validity of Teva’s patent78 and later 
resolved infringement claims at a bench trial,79 the allocation of 
decisionmaking authority between the judge and a jury with regard to 
resolving the indefiniteness question as well as the scope of appellate 
review of the claim indefiniteness determination did not surface. 
Nonetheless, Teva informs those questions. 
Like the standard of review of patent claim construction, the Federal 
Circuit has viewed the standard of review of claim indefiniteness as a pure 
question of law pursuant to the now overruled Cybor decision. In Atmel 
Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc.,80 the Federal Circuit reasoned 
that: 
“A determination of claim indefiniteness is a legal conclusion that is drawn 
from the court’s performance of its duty as the construer of patent claims.” See 
Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. International Trade Comm’n, 
161 F.3d 696, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Indefiniteness, therefore, like claim 
construction, is a question of law that we review de novo. See id. at 702; cf. 
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 
banc) (holding that claim construction is a question of law reviewed de 
novo).81 
In view of the Supreme Court’s rejection of Cybor’s de novo standard 
of review of patent claim construction in Teva, there is good reason to 
believe that a district judge’s determination of claim indefiniteness would 
also fall within the Rule 52(a)(6) framework on which the Supreme Court 
relied. Under the Supreme Court’s Nautilus decision, Section 112(b) 
requires that “a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and 
prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the 
invention with reasonable certainty.”82 Thus, like claim construction, the 
district judge may well need to hear from skilled artisans and resolve 
 
77  See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2125 (2014). 
78  See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 578 (S.D.N.Y 2011) 
[https://perma.cc/483H-JNJT]. 
79  See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 295 (S.D.N.Y 2012) 
[https://perma.cc/G6WK-37SA]. 
80  198 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999) [https://perma.cc/K3R3-8HVR]. 
81  Id. at 1378. 
82  Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129. 
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disputes in determining whether the claims are indefinite. And where 
experts disagree, the court will be required to make subsidiary factual 
findings based upon the credibility of the witnesses or tools available to 
district judges. Hence, the lower court’s factual findings are entitled to 
deference by the Federal Circuit to the extent that the intrinsic evidence 
does not control. 
The Teva case also sheds light on the allocation of decisionmaking 
authority between judge and jury. The majority confirmed that the Supreme 
Court used the phrase “within the province of the court” in Markman to 
create a distinct category of rulings with a factual basis that lie outside of 
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury.83 Like claim construction, the 
assessment of claim indefiniteness has no direct antecedent in pre-1791 
cases.84 Moreover, the same functional considerations that led the Court to 
place claim construction within the province of the court apply to 
indefiniteness.85 Therefore, although claim indefiniteness ought not be 
characterized as a pure question of law, it nonetheless falls exclusively 
“within the province of the court.” 
Even though the question of claim indefiniteness is, like claim 
construction, a question for the judge and not a jury, the evidentiary 
standard for invalidity defenses is higher (clear and convincing evidence) 
than for claim construction (preponderance of the evidence) due to the 
Patent Act’s presumption of validity.86 Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine 
a scenario in which a judge were to decide that a term cannot be construed 
under the preponderance standard but declines to hold that it is indefinite 
due to the higher clear and convincing standard. This seems to be a 
distinction without a difference, but it would nonetheless be prudent for a 
district judge to state in finding a claim is indefinite that she does so by 
clear and convincing evidence. In essence, the preponderance and clear and 
convincing evidence standards collapse in this situation. 
The upshot of these considerations is that district judges ought to 
resolve the question of claim indefiniteness at the same stage that it 
considers claim construction. This will economize judicial resources, 
simplify patent litigation, and potentially increase settlement where 
subsidiary factual underpinnings entitle the district judge’s resolution to 
deference on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s Teva decision brings the standard of review of 
patent construction rulings into line with foundational juridical principles of 
 
83  Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837–38 (2015). 
84  Id. at 378–84. 
85  See id. at 384–90. 
86  See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) [http://perma.cc/NE65-RY9M]; cf. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 
131 S. Ct. 2238, 2244–51 (2011) [https://perma.cc/K8KH-QW66]. 
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appellate review, resolving one of the most divisive issues in patent 
litigation over the past two decades. Its efficacy, however, depends 
critically upon district judges earning deference for the right reasons. 
District judges will need to implement effective procedures for ferreting out 
subsidiary factual disputes bearing on claim construction, scour the intrinsic 
evidence for contraindications, develop a sufficient evidentiary record for 
resolving the dispute, and explain their analysis. To borrow a phrase from 
grade school teachers, district courts must not merely record their answer; 
they must “show their work.” Such an approach holds the promise of 
ensuring that claim construction integrates careful analysis of the intrinsic 
evidence with reliable evidence, where needed, of how skilled artisans 
understand patent claim terms. 
 
